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ABSTRACT
Canada recognized early the value of mobile
satellite communications, originally through the
planning of a military system (MUSAT) and
subsequently through the development of the Canadian
MSAT system. Acting on behalf of the government, the
Department of Communications (DOC) defined and
carried out a complete plan for the implementation of
Mobile Satellite Services (MSS). Based on an
extensive dialogue between government, industry and
users and encompassing all technical, economic
regulatory and institutional aspects, this plan
resulted in the completion by 1986 of a comprehensive
business plan and a decision for commercial MSS
detivery. The Canadian lead for a commercial system
was quickly followed by others, and in particular the
U.S., giving rise to the concept of North American
HSS. In moving rapidly towards commercialization, we
must learn from the past and plan for the future.
INTRODUCTION
Canada has been in the forefront of satellite
communications for almost 30 years. In 1962, Canada
became the third country in the world to launch a
satellite and to pioneer satellite communications
through Alouette i, an upper atmospheric research
satellite.
Although in intervening years surging
international demands resulted in the proliferation
of communications satellites, Canada continued to
play a leading role in the development of new
applications communications satellites. The DOC
teamed up with the U.S. National Aeronautics and
Space Administration (NASA) in the development and
launch in 1976 of the Communications Technology
Satellite (CTS), a direct broadcast satellite.
Again, in the 1970's, the DOC in cooperation with the
Canadian Department of National Defence (DND) and
other government departments, developed the concept
of a Canadian multi-purpose UHF satellite communicat-
ions system called MUSAT. This system was conceived
as the most cost-effective means of satisfying
government needs for voice and data communications
with ships, aircraft, vehicles and transportable
stations operating in the Canadian north and other
areas where conventional terrestrial systems could
not provide services for technical and economic
reasons. The t4USAT system would have operated in the
240-400 MHz band which is used extensively in both
Canada and the United States for military
communications and was the forerunner of MSAT.
At the 1979 WARC, the decision was taken to
permit shared satellite and terrestrial
communications services to mobile radio and telephone
users in the 806-890 NHz frenuency band in Region 2
(North and South America). This new allocation
allowed the benefits of mobile satellite
communications to be extended to the general public
and non-military government applications in such
areas as oil exploration and exploitation, mining,
trucking, shipping, business, personal
communications, law enforcement, forest fire
fighting, ambulance communications and resource
management in remote areas. The availability of
mobile satellite communications to the public at
large was of distinct interest in view of the
Canadian topography. The DOC re-directed its efforts
to conduct preliminary studies in cooperation with
PASA in early 1980 on the use of satellite technology
in the provision of public mobile communications
services in Canada and the U.S. These studies
explored system concepts and gave strbng indications
that market demand would be sufficient to ensure the
future commercial viability of satellite systems
providing services to mobile terminals if the
reouired technology and services were developed.
Thus the main emphasis shifted to minimizing or
eliminating the technical , commercial and
administrative risks involved. In effect, the
government invested approximately $20M, during 1982
and 1983, in order to fully justify the $200M-$3OOM
implementation expenditure involved.
The government absorbed the complete cost of
these studies since, under the original program
direction, government was to be the main investor and
owner of a demonstration MSAT system. The private
sector's subsenuent expression of interest in
eliminating the demonstration system and moving
directly to a commercially funded and owned system
was in line with the strategic objectives defined for
the Program at the outset. In fact, the
private-sector interest in a commercial system was
proof that the original targets of the Program had
not only been met, but were exceeded. In 19_a,
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Telesat Canada assumed the role of the satellite
owner and operator, and later transferred this role
to a subsidiary Telesat Mobile Inc. (TMI).
This change in program direction did not
significantly affect or alter the original
objectives, although it did increase the strategic
importance of the market and economic viability
studies as well as the expedient implementation of
the appropriate regulatory, institutional and
international arrangements.
CANADIAN MSAT PROGRAM DEVELOPMENT
Program Objectives
There are two primary objectives governing the
Canadian MSAT Program:
i) The development and availability of efficient and
diverse mobile communications services in
underserved areas of Canada; and
2) The creation of the necessary conditions under
which Canadian domestic industry can develop and
market effectively MSAT services and products
domestically and internationally.
Although preliminary studies were encouraging,
there still prevailed considerable skepticism as to
whether or not the state of the art was sufficiently
advanced as to permit the introduction of such
services at realistic cost and risk. In this
environment, it was essential to the achievement of
objectives that the key collaborators be assured of
reasonable risk-benefit tradeoffs. In the case of
government it was important to show that the overall
socio-economic benefits justified the expenditure of
the public funds required for technology development
and risk-sharing programs. Service providers had to
be reasonably assured of sufficiently attractive
returns on investment that would outweigh the higher
than normal risks involved. Finally, manufacturers
had to be reasonably assured that near term research
and development outlays would translate into
long-term portfolio and revenue gains.
Program Structure
Given the environment, it was evident that the
DOC would have to provide much more than technical,
financial and institutional support. What was
required was an all-encompassing BUSINESS PLAN for
the Development and Commercialization of Mobile
Satellite Services (MSS), to be developed and managed
by DOC on behalf of one of the main players
(government) in consultation and cooperation with the
other two (service and manufacturing industries).
The resulting structure entailed numerous elements,
with the main ones being:
1) system and service definition
2) user indoctrination and interaction
3) market definition and development
4) development of enabling technologies
5) overall commercial viability and socio-economic
benefit evaluation
6) domestic regulatory and institutional
arrangements
7) government risk-sharing support
8) international coordination and cooperation
The intent was for this BUSINESS PLAN to be
fully executed in the five-year interval 19B2-1987,
with the ultimate success criterion of handing
Program leadership over to the private sector at the
end of that period.
System and Service Definition: Early in the
program evolution, it was recognized that MSAT was
unlike any other telecommunications system previously
implemented which catered to point-to-point
telecommunications. This was, indeed, a
Telecommunications Distribution Network of
end-user mobile satellite services similar, in many
respects, to the telephone network.
Thus, two early documents were prepared, one
dealing with a proposed system concept, z and the
other defining a strawman services and applications
scenario. 2 The system concept served as the main
source document for the numerous technical system
studies carried out in-house and through contracts
let to the private sector. The strawman service
description formed the basis of an unprecedented
program of end-user indoctrination and interaction.
It is interesting to note that the main service
concepts contained in the strawman document have
withstood the test of time and form the basis of
presently proposed services and applications.
User Indoctrination and Interaction: In the
1982-1984 timeframe, user and service provider
awareness of the potential of MSS was lagging
considerably. The user audience to which the
services were addressed was primarily familiar with
private network radio communications and the majority
of prospective MSS service providers were primarily
familiar with point-to-point satellite
communications. DOC initiated an intensive
indoctrination program reaching hundreds of potential
user organizations across Canada. Some two hundred
of these became sufficiently interested as to enter
into a continuing dialogue with DOC. This dialogue
resulted in a broad base of educated users on one
hand and on the other provided invaluable feedback on
potential service refinements and improvements that
were instrumental in finalizing the repertory of MSS
services presently advocated. The user interaction
resulted in a further originally unexpected benefit.
Due to the broad user base involved and the close
interaction, extremely detailed market demand and
cost-sensitivity projections were obtained. In many
respects, these projections proved to be more
accurate and meaningful than the information compiled
through statistical market and cost-sensitivity
studies. For instance, the first indication of the
now proven large demand for message oriented and
other data services first became apparent through the
user interaction process. Early user involvement has
proven an invaluable tool in system and service
evolution.
Market Definition and Development: Apart
from the market and cost sensitivity obtained through
the user interaction, a major statistical study was
carried out by Woods Gordon Management
Consultants. 3 This study was primarily based on
feedback received from an extensive mailed
questionnaire and a limited number of interviews.
Although the questionnaire format failed to reveal
certain characteristics and aspects of the market,
such as the issue of data services previously
mentioned, it constitutes, nonetheless, the most
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extensive independent market analysis available and
its findings, modified through subsequent
experiences, formed the basis for the commercial
viability and socio-economic benefit assessments.
In addition to the overall market potential the
Woods Gordon study provided inputs on the cost
sensitivity of the MSAT services indicating the
percentage of the potential market to be captured if
the services were to be priced according to a number
of pricing alternatives. Based on the above and
after applying certain correction factors, to account
for information made available at a later time or
received from other sources, TMI developed the
"baseline" market scenario used in the business
plan.6
While market definition and sensitivity studies
provide a good indication of potential commercial
viability, the actual rate of market penetration is
highly dependent on the early development of a broad
user base. This is especially true in the case of
MSS where the lag between system and service
definition and actual implementation is very large.
Recognizing this, the DOC defined and sponsored a
program of trials and experiments aimed at generating
user awareness and allowing potential end-user
service providers to develop specialized services and
products. This program is still ongoing and is
dependent on the procurement of airtime on satellites
of opportunity. While extremely well received this
program has not reached its full potential due to
uncertainties associated with the procurement of
adequate airtime and overall program delays that have
impacted user confidence.
Development of Enabllng Technologies: For
all the emphasis paid on other elements of the
Program that helped define and justify the overall
business plan, technology development consumed the
bulk of the budget and resources of the program.
Over twenty major studies were commissioned on space
and ground segment development. 4 Major attention
was paid to payload, user terminal and UHF antenna
technology considered critical in the formulation of
the overall business plan. In parallel, extensive
in-house research has been and continues to be
carried out at the Communications Research Centre
(CRC) of the DOC on both digital and analogue vocoder
development. A major portion of the products of this
development has been already passed on to industry.
By virtue of catering to the expedient
development of a Canadian commercial system,
technology development has focused primarily on near
term development targets. As a result, second
generation requirements have only just started to
receive serious attention.
The most significant results, to date, have been
accomplished in the area of payload development with
SPAR Aerospace holding a prominent place amongst
international satellite manufacturers.
Overall Commercial Viability and
Soclo-Economic Benefit Evaluatlon: The effect of
the Program on a number of sectors had to be assessed
in order to arrive at an overall evaluation of the
impact of MSS introduction. Key areas evaluated were
the impact on the communications industry as a
whole,5, 6 the commercial viability for the
implementors of MSS, 7 the impact on the
manufacturing industry, 8 and the end-user
benefits. 9 It being crucial that these
evaluations were realistic and unbiased, the DOC
chose to task the principals, wherever possible, in
the conduct of the required studies. Using these
studies as an input, overall socio-economic
assessmentI0 was carried out. The results were
interesting, although predictable. Users of MSS
stood to gain the most and the fastest;
Communications Carriers could expect very good
long-term returns after a somewhat bumpy ride
initially; the potential markets generated for
equipment suppliers were extremely large but subject
to keen competition; and finally, the overall
benefits to the country promised to be very
substantial thereby fully justifying government
financial support and risk-sharing.
Regulatory and Instltutional Arrangements:
Given the extremely encouraging results from other
elements of the program, the DOC moved quickly to
resolve the regulatory and institutional issues
involved. Within the framework of existing domestic
communications policy and regulations the following
actions were taken: TMI was designated as the sole
satellite owner and operator; a framework for
end-user service distribution was established; and
guidelines for the appropriate regulatory policies
were issued. Suddenly the issue of Frequency
allocations became the only remaining unresolved
piece of the puzzle.
Ever since the inception of the Program, a
domestic frequency allocation at 800 MHz was taken as
a given. In the euphoria created by the allocations
obtained at the 1979 WARC, certain major issues
pertaining to the adequacy of spectrum and the
difficulties of bilateral coordination were partially
overlooked. Suddenly it became apparent that the
planned Canadian use of the very limited UHF spectrum
available at 800 MHz would be subject to long and
arduous negotiations between the Canadian and
American administrations. As a result, the search
for additional or alternate spectrum began again in
both Canada and the U.S. with attention directed at
the 1.5 GHz band. But the results of this search
could not be known prior to WARC-MOB 1987. With all
other aspects of the domestic MSAT business plan in
place, government and industry agreed to finalize and
publicly announce, in early 1986, the implementation
decision for the domestic MSAT system, subject to
adequate spectrum allocations in the 1987 time
frame.
Government Risk-Sharlng Support: Key to the
final decision for MSAT implementation were the
official endorsement and submission by TMI of a
comprehensive Business Proposal ,11 and an
extensive Cabinet Document prepared by DOC. In April
1986, the government approved a support package
containing the following major items:
I) approximately $30M of 50¢ dollars for the
development of MSAT space and ground segment
products;
2) up to $20M for the sponsoring of user trials; and
3) a $126M guaranteed lease for MSAT services to be
procured from TMI over the life of the first
generation system or a period of 15 years,
whichever is longer.
Assessment of the MSAT Business Plan
Development: By virtue of its charter to be the
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chosen government instrument for both communications
technology development and regulatory and
institutional policies, DOC was in a position to
define, develop, and justify a complete Business
Development Plan.
Under this Plan, and having proved technical
feasibility, commercial viability and overall
socio-economic benefits, the DOC succeeded in putting
in place the following commercialization enabling
arrangements.
- a satellite owner and operator was selected and
assured of a licence as early as 1983;
- an original domestic spectrum decision was taken as
early as 1982 and modified in 1986 as a result of
the associated FCC rulemaking;
- key players for the space and ground segment were
identified as early as 1983;
- the types and levels of government support and
incentives required to reduce risk were developed;
and
- Program implementation received final approval by
April 1986
All of the above helped define the set of key
players and the form of the playing field, thus
allowing the cooperative evolution of detailed
systems and service parameters, a proposed service
distribution scenario and a unified government and
private sector front in international negotiations
and coordination matters. Technical-economic
tradeoffs were considered early. For instance, even
though the technical feasibility of large spacecraft
antennas was already demonstrated and the DOC was
proposing antennas as large as 10 meters in diameter,
it became apparent that both manufacturers and
service providers were not prepared to adopt them for
the first generation on the grounds of cost and risk.
Other countries have since adopted a similar cautious
approach on their proposed and, about to be,
implemented systems.
Effective April 1986, the Canadian MSAT Program
has been turned over to the private sector with DOC
maintaining a support and oversight role. This is
one year prior to the originally anticipated date and
could have occurred as early as 1985 in the absence
of spectrum availability complications.
Finally, commercialization of the Canadian
Program acted as a catalyst for the acceleration of
commercial plans in the U.S.
International Cooperation and Coordination:
Throughout the MSAT Program development the DOC
engaged in numerous cooperative arrangements
involving domestic and international collaboration.
Major domestic cooperative arrangements were executed
with Telesat Canada first through a Memorandum of
Understanding (MOU) subsequently replaced by a Joint
Endeavour Agreement (JEA). Similarly, an MOU was
executed between DOC and Spar Aerospace.
Internationally, by far the most notable cooperation
has been that with NASA, officially governed by the
conditions contained in the NASA/DOC MOA executed in
1983. However the NASA/DOC cooperation is primarily
a long standing association which has extended over a
period of 20 years and is expected to continue in the
1990's at least as Far as the present and future
generations of MSS are concerned.
DOC's mandate further extends in the areas of
international coordination. In this capacity DOC
represents Canada in international fora such as the
ITU and CCIR and in bilateral and multilateral
negotiations such as frequency coordination,
reciprocal operating agreements, etc. In this
capacity, DOC has maintained a continuous interface
with the FCC on MSAT Program matters, holds frequent
meetings on MSAT spectrum coordination with INMARSAT,
the U.S.S.R. and the U.S. and speaks on behalf of
Canada in the ITU. These meetings which are de facto
intense and partisan, have once again demonstrated
that even the 1.5-1.7 GHz allocations established in
1987 are not sufficient to meet all reasonable
domestic and international demands. Clearly the
WARC-MOB 1992 will be faced with renewed demands for
additional MSS allocations.
NORTH AMERICAN MSAT DEVELOPMENT
The difficulties encountered with the frequency
allocations in the 800 MHz band were a sobering
experience for Canada and possibly NASA. These
difficulties did act, however, as a silver lining in
that they generated wide awareness of the limited
resource environment and of the need to think in
terms of a North American MSS as opposed to
individual national programs. This concept had
certainly been considered by DOC and HASA in the
past, but might have not been easy to sell to the
regulators and the entrepreneurs but for the spectrum
crisis that developed. As a result, there developed
strong synergies between private sector counterparts
in Canada and the U.S. as well as between the two
administrations.
Finding themselves in a clearly underdog
position prior to WARC-MOB 87, the two
administrations aligned their positions and embarked
on a worldwide campaign to generate international
support for their proposal to generalize the existing
mobile satellite allocations in the 1.5 - 1.7 GHz
bands. Although not all of the Canada/U.S. proposals
were accepted in the WARC-MOB 87, the resulting
modifications contained in the final acts of the
conference must be regarded as a victory, given the
strong opposition provided by most European
administrations and others.
The would be MSS providers in both Canada and
the U.S. also moved quickly to endorse the North
American service concept. Spectrum shortages were
amongst the leading factors but the process was also
assisted by the fact that U.S. MSS hopefuls Found it
expedient to align their efforts with those of TMI
who was already the designated Canadian satellite
owner and operator. Finally, both sides had a lot to
gain by minimizing their initial capital
expenditures. For whatever reasons, the present
common approach towards MSS development makes
immanent sense. The recent signing of a Joint
Operating Agreement between TMI and the American
Mobile Satellite Corporation (AMSC) is a major step
towards the long overdue implementation of MSS in
North America. While there are still outstanding
issues remaining, it is reasonable to assume that
these will be resolved in an expeditious manner;
there is just too much competition domestically and
internationally to afford the luxury of further major
delays.
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The DOC, in its continuing role of support,
oversight and policy implementation, will continue to
fully support and encourage the quick implementation
of MSS in North America.
LESSONS LEARNED
Successes and Failures
There have been numerous accounts of the
Canadian MSS development and, for his part, this
author vows that this is his last attempt at a post
mortum. MSS is well on the road to maturity and
should be treated accordingly. For these reasons, a
moment of reflection is well in order.
It is perhaps an overlooked fact that the MSS
development has signalled the end of infancy for
satellite communications services, for prior to MSAT
and for all the mystique of space, satellite systems
remained a glorified Form of carrier or cable
systems. For the first time, a satellite-based
system had to cope with end-user service and all the
complexities involved in the interconnection,
distribution and control of a large communications
network. The trend is irreversible! More and more
future sate111te service offerings will involve total
network approaches.
The realization followed naturally but not
without considerable strain that implementation
decisions should not be left solely in the hands of
satellite designers but instead should be strongly
influenced and guided by service, network and
marketing experts. The total network and service
design concept was born.
Upon reflection, the single most important
outcome of the approach adopted was the early
involvement of the end-users and the end-user service
providers in an iterative process that proved
invaluable. The message was very clear: "MSS is
from the people and for the people". Such mass
consultations usually tend to become cumbersome and
ineffective unless properly orchestrated. For this
reason, the formation of committees was limited to a
minimum, most of the dialogue being on a one to one
basis. Ultimate control remained with the program
planners.
DOC's wide jurisdictional powers on
telecommunications coupled with the prevailing
Canadian con_nunications policies were instrumental in
the development and implementation of an integrated
Business Development Plan that resulted in the
resolution of all Canadian domestic issues in the
short period of 3 years. In a contrast in styles,
the MSAT development in the U.S. depended upon the
respective jurisdictions of NASA, FCC and to a
certain degree NTIA with a resulting much longer
interval of completion. The inherent merits of the
two styles not being the issue, it is undoubtedly
clear that prompt Program implementation was the
result of the abfl_ty to embrace all Program
activities within a single entity.
While recalling the many bright points of the
Program, one cannot but temper them wlth the
recognition of things not so well accomplished.
Domestically the area that is lagging the most is the
emergence of a strong manufacturing base for ground
segment equipment. For all the intensive research
carried out by the DOC, for all the incentives and in
contrast to the satellite manufacturers, this sector
has been reluctant to commit to a long range
portfolio development choosing to focus instead on
short-term product development. As a result, the
area most lagging today is that of network and user
equipment development.
Finally, the handling of spectrum issues leaves a lot
to be desired. Undoubtedly, the most frustrating and
damaging to the Program development have been the
years 1985-1987 during which spectrum availability
was in serious jeopardy. Not only did user
confidence sink to a low but in addition, this
period was marked by the emergence of a number of
competing systems and services.
Paradoxically, the total violation of the old
and proven saying of not counting one's chickens
before they are hatched may have proven to be the
Program's silver lining! The development of MSS was
based on the perceived availability of mobile
spectrum at 800 MHz. But for this perception, it is
highly unlikely that NASA and DOC would have embarked
so vigorously on the MSAT Program development. In
the absence of such commitment, it is questionable if
the North American private sector would have been
ready to commit to any form of cooperative program
development, or if the Canadian and U.S.
administrations would have pushed as hard as they did
at WARC-MOB 87 or if the rest of the world would have
been willing to take seriously any attempts to modify
the existing mobile satellite allocations at 1.5
1.7 GHz. What could have been the greatest blunder
in North American MSS development turned out to be a
blessing in disguise.
But the spectrum lesson must remain wlth us
because the future success and survival of MSS will
undoubtedly depend on it. A lot was made in WARC B7
of the "great compromise" praised by so many of us
that were there. Was it really a great compromise or
was it that INMARSAT suddenly realized, in mid
conference, that it had jus t as much to gain and
perhaps more by agreeing to selective change? We may
never really know! One thing is certain; we must
never again allow MSS viability to be subject to
uncertainty and last-mlnute compromises.
The Moment of Truth
For all the things that went right or wrong
North American MSS implementation is only a few years
away and yet several major issues need still to be
addressed and resolved. Bilateral issues such as
transborder service, licensing and type approval must
be addressed; Difficult multilateral spectrum
coordination deliberations must be completed; and
above all the perception of a viable and expanding
service offering must be maintained and enhanced
through further mobile satellite allocations in
1992.
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